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INSTITUTION-BASED WEAKNESSES 
BEHIND EMERGING MULTINATIONALS
Undertaking foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) is the defining fea-
ture of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). While emerging econo-
mies as recipients of FDI are fami-
liar with MNEs, these MNEs tend 
to be firms from the developed 
world. A new breed of home-gro-
wn MNEs has now arisen from the 
emerging economies, in particular 
the group known as BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China). In this 
article, the term “emerging mul-
tinationals” is employed to refer 
to this new group of BRIC-based 
MNEs. The type of FDI made 
overseas by this group of emer-
ging multinationals, is defined by 
a more accurate term, outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI), 
that is now used to differentiate 
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it from the traditional FDI found 
in emerging economies, which is 
technically inward FDI (IFDI). 
Overall, the OFDI made by the 
emerging multinationals that form 
BRIC is responsible for almost half 
of all the OFDI from emerging 
economies. This new OFDI made 
by emerging multinationals has 
led to sensational headlines. How 
are these emerging multinationals 
different from their counterparts in 
developed economies? How can 
we make sense of them? How can 
experts in management provide a 
better understanding of the emer-
ging multinationals? 
Compared to the multinatio-
nals from developed economies, 
emerging multinationals are unique 
with regard to their relationship 
with their national governments, 
their degree of political involve-
ment, and the relative importance 
of their home markets. In addition, 
these emerging multinationals, in 
particular those from BRIC coun-
tries, may possess country-specific 
and firm-specific advantages in ter-
ms of natural resources, economies 
of scale, labor, and the cost of ca-
pital. The emergence of these new 
emerging multinationals is widely 
hailed as embodying the strengths 
of the home economies that give 
rise to them. This is true to a certain 
extent – it is impossible to genera-
te surplus capital to fund overseas 
expansion if these firms are una-
ble to achieve strong sales in their 
home economies and if their home 
economies have not grown in the 
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first place. The media has tended 
to treat this question in a sensa-
tional way, and it has attracted an 
increasing amount of documented 
academic research.  This situation 
is consistent with the traditional 
MNE theory which addresses the 
strengths of the MNEs and their 
home economies. 
However, what has not been 
covered by either the media or 
traditional theory is an opposing 
view of considerable importance 
that has been overlooked. This 
view suggests that a lot of the 
OFDI made by the emerging mul-
tinationals reflects the existence of 
a number of institutional weak-
nesses that can be found in their 
home economies in a macro con-
text and possibly in the product, 
labor, and/or capital markets as 
well. These emerging multinatio-
nals are accustomed to operating 
in an environment that may lack 
an appropriate financial structure 
or mechanisms to protect inves-
tors in their home countries. This 
kind of national environment may 
also be characterized by less than 
optimal levels of transparency in 
their regulatory systems and busi-
ness environments. We argue that 
a solid, balanced, and insightful 
understanding of this new pheno-
menon – OFDI made by emerging 
multinationals – cannot be attai-
ned without an equally determined 
attempt to probe  the institution-
-based determinants that lie behind 
the emerging multinationals. This 
essay seeks to offset the almost 
one-sided coverage of the “streng-
ths” side of this phenomenon by 
dealing with the “weaknesses”. 
Our aim is to leverage the recent 
emergence of OFDI to extend and 
enhance the institution-based view 
of international business strategy 
(PENg et al, 2008, 2009).
ANOMALIES IN THE 
PATTERN OF OFDI 
MADE BY EMERGING 
MULTINATIONALS
Let us start with two leading ques-
tions: 
•	 Which	 emerging	 economy	 of	
the BRIC group has generated 
the largest amount of OFDI 
stock?
•	 Which	 economy	 has	 received	
the largest amount of OFDI 
from multinationals in the 
following emerging countries: 
Brazil, Russia, India and China?
Based on the experience of 
our lectures and interviews with 
undergraduate, MBA, and executi-
ve education students around the 
world, when answering the first 
question, most people would cite 
China, followed by Brazil or India. 
Almost everybody in the room was 
shocked when we told them that 
of the BRIC countries, Russia has 
generated the largest amount of 
OFDI stock (KUzNETsOv, 2011). 
While the Western media is full of 
accounts of China’s OFDI, such as 
in Brazil (see Brasil Econômico’s 
interview with the first co-author of 
this article in 2010), Russia’s OFDI 
stock (2.1% of the world total) is 
much larger than China’s (1.5% of 
the world total) (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Yet, since 1991, no Western media 
outlet has bothered to report on any 
“Russia threat”. Instead, the media 
is full of articles about a perceived 
“China threat” in terms of econo-
mic competition. Russia’s economy 
(which has the 11th largest gDP) is 
much smaller (about four times) than 
China’s (with the 2nd largest gDP). 
If OFDI is a reflection of the streng-
ths of the home economy, how can 
firms from a much smaller and pre-
sumably weaker emerging economy 
generate so much more OFDI? 
Moreover, the main recipient of 
Russia’s OFDI is tiny Cyprus. Brazil’s 
multinationals invest heavily in the 
British virgin Islands (BvI), while 
India’s OFDI has flooded Mauritius. 
A full two-thirds of China’s OFDI 
has gone to Hong Kong, and the 
second largest recipient of China’s 
OFDI is the BvI. How can these 
relatively small economies, which 
are well-known as tax havens, ab-
sorb so much OFDI from BRIC? A 
close analysis of the available data 
shows that they do not. In fact, a 
high percentage of this OFDI is 
re-invested back to BRIC – this is 
known as capital round-tripping 
(FUNg et al, 2011). The principal 
foreign investors (of stock) in Bra-
zil, Russia, India, and China are the 
BvI, Cyprus, Mauritius, and Hong 
Kong, respectively. In China, the 
BvI has the second largest FDI sto-
ck. In other words, the “real” OFDI 
that is used to acquire local outfits, 
build factories, and compete with 
local rivals is much smaller than the 
total OFDI dollar figures suggest. 
Why should managers and firms 
in BRIC undergo such an arduous 
process of capital round-tripping? 
We argue that the institutional we-
aknesses in the home economies 
are outweighed by the potential 
benefits associated with this kind 
of capital round-tripping. 
INSTITUTION-BASED 
WEAKNESSES
If it is taken into account that a con-
siderable amount of the OFDI from 
BRIC is fueled by institution-based 
weaknesses in these emerging eco-
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nomies, it follows that their domes-
tic institutions for protecting private 
property and facilitating investment 
must be weak. For instance, in Bra-
zil, bureaucratic regulations and he-
avy taxation on domestic earnings 
have created incentives for firms to 
invest overseas. As of 2008, two-
-thirds of Brazil’s OFDI stock went 
to tax havens such as the BvI and 
Cayman Islands. Another related 
question is: Which economy in the 
Latin America and the Caribbean re-
gion has generated the largest OFDI 
stock? Almost everybody in our au-
dience assumed it was Brazil, but 
it is not. It is the BvI – year in and 
year out. In 2010 (the most recent 
year for which data from the World 
Investment Report 2011 are availa-
ble), the BvI generated about twice 
the amount of OFDI flow as Bra-
zil ($21 billion versus $11 billion). 
In the year before (2009), the BvI 
generated $28 billion OFDI flow, 
while Brazil actually suffered from 
a large negative OFDI flow of $10 
billion (that is: Brazil received more 
IFDI than its OFDI abroad and the 
difference was $10 billion). What 
happened in 2009 was very signi-
ficant: Brazil’s negative OFDI flow 
and the BvI’s strong OFDI flow 
were due to intra-company loans 
from Brazilian MNEs’ (primarily 
BvI-based) affiliates and subsidia-
ries to their parent companies at 
home, in an effort to combat the 
global recession that had a negative 
impact on Brazil.   
As well as being concerned 
about the factors outlined above, in 
Russia, India, and China, managers 
and firms are concerned about po-
litical instability, which may result 
in the expropriation of their assets. 
given the political uncertainty in 
Russia, this fear is likely to remain a 
strong economic factor. This at least 
partially explains the much higher 
proportion of Russia’s OFDI relati-
ve to gDP, noted earlier. In India, 
the License Raj was intimidating. 
The founders of Mittal steel (now 
part of ArcelorMittal) were born in 
India, but draconian Indian regu-
lations drove them abroad where 
they registered their firm in the 
Netherlands via OFDI. Then they 
invested money back to India and 
other countries. Likewise, Chinese 
regulations are friendlier to foreign 
investors than to domestic firms, 
especially domestic private firms. 
The Chinese government’s rationale 
is to offer preferential treatment to 
lure foreign firms, and it has largely 
succeeded in this regard. However, 
the drawback of this policy is that 
it has driven many Chinese firms to 
invest overseas. Overall, in respon-
se to the hostile climate created by 
institutions in their home country, 
a large number of managers and 
firms in Russia, India, and China 
have made a rational decision to 
turn their operations at home into 
“subsidiaries” of foreign firms which 
are registered in places like Cyprus, 
Mauritius, and Hong Kong (and 
the BvI). In other words, when 
one probes more deeply into the 
institution-based reasoning behind 
decisions regarding OFDI from 
emerging economies, a lot of we-
aknesses in these economies are 
revealed. 
AN INSTITUTION-BASED 
RESEARCH AGENDA
Academic specialists have argued 
that institutional frameworks are 
made up of formal and informal 
constraints that interact with orga-
nizations. These institutional fra-
meworks help firms by reducing 
uncertainty. Traditional research 
into MNEs, which is almost exclu-
sively based on the experience of 
MNEs from developed economies, 
has been conducted through a 
“strengths” perspective. As noted 
earlier, this “strengths” perspecti-
ve can explain some of the OFDI 
made by emerging multinationals. 
However, it is clear that traditional 
theory cannot fully explain, nor 
help us predict, the strategy, beha-
vior, and performance of emerging 
multinationals. Employing, broade-
ning, and deepening our unders-
tanding of the “weaknesses” pers-
pective is essential to supplement 
the “strengths” perspective.
We argue that what in the-
oretical terms can significantly 
help advance the “weaknesses” 
perspective is an institution-based 
view, which lays stress on the dy-
namic interaction between institu-
tions and organizations, and takes 
full account of strategic choices as 
being the logical outcome of the-
se interactions (PENg et al, 2008, 
2009). The rationale is that strategic 
choices, such as undertaking OFDI, 
is not merely driven by industrial 
conditions and firm-specific re-
sources, but are also a reflection 
of the formal and informal cons-
traints of a particular institutional 
framework that managers confront. 
While the proposition that “insti-
tutions matter” is hardly novel or 
controversial, we have yet to un-
lock the institutional “black box” 
that lies behind the rise of OFDI 
from emerging multinationals. 
Existing theories about MNE either 
ignore capital round-tripping or 
experience difficulty in explaining 
it. A thorough search of material 
in the leading journal in the field, 
Journal of International Business 
Studies (JIBS), since it was founded 
in 1970, discovered that when we 
used key phrases such as “round 
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tripping,” “institutional arbitrage,” 
and “regulatory arbitrage” in arti-
cles titles or abstracts, there was 
only a single article by Fung et al. 
(2011). While this article is a useful 
start, clearly more research needs 
to be conducted on these crucially 
important but surprisingly unde-
rexplored topics. 
From an institution-based stan-
dpoint, MNEs that undertake capi-
tal round-tripping tend to engage 
in institutional or regulatory arbi-
trage (FUNg et al, 2011). If we en-
deavor to leverage the OFDI from 
emerging multinationals to build 
new theories and enhance our un-
derstanding of this new phenome-
non in global competition, further 
institution-based research on the 
institutional weaknesses inherent 
in emerging economies that drive 
OFDI is required.
 This institution-based research 
agenda is not only of significance 
for MNEs from emerging econo-
mies, but also potentially impor-
tant for MNEs from developed 
economies as well. The following 
is a case in point: tax havens be-
came tax havens before the more 
recent emergence of multinationals 
from BRIC. While Brazilian and 
Chinese MNEs are attracted to the 
BvI (their first and second OFDI 
destination, respectively), so do 
many Us MNEs. The loopholes 
in Us tax laws have led to many 
special-purpose entities in the BvI 
set up by American multinationals. 
As the Obama administration has 
become more desperate in its at-
tempts to extract taxes from Us-
-based firms, the BvI can expect 
more FDI dollars from the United 
states. We can speculate that for 
the same reason that the small 
islands of the BvI, with a total po-
pulation of 30,000, cannot absorb 
that much FDI from BRIC, it also 
cannot absorb a large amount from 
the United states. In view of this, 
it can be assumed that much of 
the Us OFDI to places such as the 
BvI will be going back home too. 
Hence, when examining the insti-
tution-based logic behind OFDI, 
there are signs of convergence of 
both the emerging and developed 
economies. 
given this convergence, what, 
then, are the differences betwe-
en MNEs from the emerging and 
developed economies that make 
use of tax havens? The answer de-
pends on the question of degree. 
Despite the existence of numerous 
Us special-purpose entities in the 
BvI and the Cayman Islands, pre-
sumably for tax haven purposes, 
these countries do not appear on 
either the list of the top five reci-
pient countries of the Us OFDI or 
on the list of the top five countries 
making IFDI in the United sta-
tes. These countries are routinely 
among the top five for both OFDI 
from Brazil and China and IFDI in 
Brazil and China.   
In view of this, it is reasonable 
to ask whether this OFDI to tax 
havens for capital round-tripping 
purposes will decrease as emerging 
economies develop more business-
-friendly institutions. This may be 
the case, but it is evident that as 
the Us loses its competitiveness 
in offering business-friendly insti-
tutions (in other words, if the tax 
burdens become too high for Us 
firms), the BvI and the Cayman 
Islands may one day appear on 
the list of the top five recipient 
countries of Us OFDI or on the list 
of the top five countries making 
IFDI in the United states. In short, 
the institution-based weaknesses 
of the Us economy may also dri-
ve some of its firms to undertake 
similar OFDI. 
POLICY AND MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATIONS
For policymakers in emerging eco-
nomies, the implications of what 
has been discussed above are two-
fold. First, they must strengthen 
their positive role in support of 
OFDI. For example, the Brazilian 
Development Bank – Banco Na-
cional de Desenvolvimento Eco-
nômico e social, BNDEs – has ac-
ted as an intermediary for a lot of 
OFDI that has been undertaken by 
emerging multinationals from Bra-
zil. second, policymakers in emer-
ging economies must take steps 
to reduce the negative aspects of 
their role. Unequal treatment be-
tween domestic and foreign firms 
has driven some Chinese firms 
abroad. Thus, if this unequal tre-
atment (technically abolished as 
of 2008) can be rectified, it may 
reduce some capital round-trip-
ping. In Russia, a greater respect 
for the law would remove a large 
number of uncertainties on the 
part of many Russian firms and 
managers, who might decide to 
invest in Russia instead of making 
the arduous capital round-trip. In 
India, reducing the discretion of 
the License Raj would go a long 
way to making badly needed in-
vestment available for industry 
at home. 
Policymakers in host countries 
should embrace a pragmatic form 
of nationalism as opposed to being 
excessively alarmed. While Brazil’s 
and India’s OFDI does not lead to 
a lot of political resistance abro-
ad, Russia’s OFDI is an especially 
sensitive issue in the former soviet 
bloc countries such as Hungary, 
Poland, and Latvia (itself part of 
the soviet Union between 1941 
and 1991). The return of the Rus-
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sian “bear” is a constant national 
nightmare for some of these coun-
tries. China’s OFDI often provokes 
the fear in the West that China is 
“buying up the world”. Pragmatic 
nationalism involves considering 
both the pros and cons of FDI and 
approving FDI only when its bene-
fits outweigh its costs. It should be 
remembered that the media “hoo-
pla” tends to focus on the streng-
ths of the economies that generate 
this kind of OFDI. However, as 
noted earlier, a lot of this OFDI is 
a reflection of the weaknesses of 
these economies, and much of this 
OFDI goes back home via capital 
round-tripping – this is something 
the media has often failed to de-
tect or chosen to ignore. In short, 
the bear from Russia or the dragon 
from China are really not so intimi-
dating, and they have a tendency 
to go back home(!). 
Managers from emerging mul-
tinationals should learn how to 
master the “rules of the game” 
both at home and abroad. While 
being “stuck at home” may be un-
pleasant, investing (and in many 
cases operating) in host countries 
may not be a “walk in the park” 
either. Even in the case of mana-
gers whose ultimate aim is to in-
vest back home after making the 
arduous capital round-trip, one 
potential benefit that they can le-
verage is that these endeavors can 
indeed broaden their outlook and 
globalize their mindset. Why not 
take advantage of these opportu-
nities to globalize their firm? As 
the founders of Mittal steel found 
out, after they left India, the world 
is their “oyster.” Once it was tho-
roughly globalized, Mittal steel 
ended up acquiring Arcelor and 
forming ArcelorMittal (the largest 
steel-maker in the world). This is 
an achievement that would have 
never materialized had Mittal ste-
el only focused on engaging in 
capital round-tripping to go back 
to India. 
“Act local, think global” is so-
mething we always teach students 
in our international business clas-
ses. While this slogan was coined 
to refer to the location-by-location 
competition of traditional MNEs, 
we can stretch it to describe the 
OFDI of emerging multinatio-
nals. Essentially, “acting local”, 
has meant that a lot of them have 
struggled to deal with institutional 
difficulties in their home coun-
try. While “thinking global”, they 
have endeavored to use capital 
round-tripping to overcome these 
national problems. However, as 
the example of Mittal steel makes 
clear, once these emerging multi-
nationals “think global”, they do 
not have to “act local” (while only 
focusing on their home country). 
In other words, once they start to 
“think global,” they can also “act 
global” by globalizing their mana-
gerial mindset and turning their 
firms into true global competitors 
instead.  
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